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Abstract: 
This paper examines the need for Leadership in Compliance by exploring recent legal reform in 
the Australian Financial Services sector.  By focusing attention on how attempts at regulatory 
change have neither eradicated previous financial reporting problems nor offered organizational 
remedies, we argue that a notion of leadership in compliance needs to be put forward which might 




This paper explores the recent spate of regulatory reforms in the Australian Financial Services 
sector which are placing a significant burden on leadership compliance. Recent reviews of 
misconduct have prompted this unprecedented level of emphasis on governance. However, little 
attention has been paid to new and revised notions of compliance, in particular the role of leaders 
in fostering a culture of change. Without effective compliance new laws are nothing more than 
empty symbolism - looking for scape goats in the event of misconduct. Given that most of the 
burden for triggering organizational culture change is placed on leaders this paper argues that 
they need to develop new strategies to cope with a new age of compliance. To this end, we 
examine the compliance regimes fostered by the new recommendations and alterations made in 
the Australian Financial Services Sector. Recent Government reports and legislation have 
enacted and imposed a range of compliance rules and behaviours on senior executives under the 
assumption that regulatory imposition on accountability equals change in organization culture. It 
is presumed that these acts as a deterrent against the risks of misconduct. However, as we argue, 
change needs to be fostered by what we would term Leadership in Compliance ensuring 
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expectations laid out in corporate governance codes and the prescriptions and standards 
encapsulated in the recent reforms. Before doing so, we shall analyse the recent major Australian 
Commissions, Reports and regulatory changes outlining the implications of these for leadership 
and the role and duty of care of Company Directors. From there we identify some pitfalls the 
current frameworks and legislation have created before outlining a model of Leadership in 
Compliance as a way forward to achieving the objectives of those regulatory reforms. 
 
The Banking Executive Accountability Regime (BEAR) and the Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority (APRA) 
The origins of BEAR can be traced back to the Australian House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Economics Review of the four major banks (the Coleman Report), where they 
found that the major banks in Australia had, ‘a poor compliance culture’ and repeatedly failed to 
protect the interests of consumers. 3 A key recommendation of the Standing Committee was to 
introduce a form of executive accountability similar to the United Kingdom’s Senior Managers 
Regime (SMR).4 After a brief period of public consultation,5 the Treasury Laws Amendment 
(Banking Executive Accountability and Related Measures) Act 2018 (Cth) came into effect. 
 
Amongst a number of measures, the new legislation imposes a heightened accountability regime 
on the banks and people who have significant influence over their conduct and behaviour.6 
Furthermore, it introduces a new definition for an ‘accountable person’ within a bank and its 
substantial subsidiaries.7 The regulator charged with enforcing BEAR is the Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA).8 
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The legislative meaning of accountable person is stipulated in section 37BA(1)(b) of the Banking 
Act 1959 (Cth). It targets senior executives with actual or effective responsibility in management 
or control of the ADI [Authorized Depositing-taking Institute] or for management or control of a 
significant or substantial part or aspect of the operations of the ADI or the relevant group of 
bodies corporate.9 Apart from the board of directors, sections 37BA(3)(b)-(j) identifies senior 
executives through named functions deemed to be accountable persons. 10 More importantly, the 
expectations of the board and senior managers are stipulated in sections 37BA(3)(a), which states 
that Board member have a, ‘responsibility for oversight of the ADI as a member of the Board of 
the ADI’. This has to be read in conjunction with section 37CA where the obligations of an 
accountable person are to: 
 act with honesty and integrity, 
 with due skill, care and diligence, 
 are expected to deal with APRA in an open, constructive and cooperative way, 
 are expected to take reasonable steps in conducting those responsibilities to prevent 
matters from arising that would adversely affect the prudential standing or prudential 
reputation of the ADI.  
It is apparent that the board has overall responsibility overseeing the senior executives in various 
departments listed in sections 37BA(3)(b)-(j). Whilst this is implicit in the statutory directors’ 
duty of care in section 180(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) the amendment denotes that 
any failure by senior executives could be regarded as a breach of directors’ duty under section 
37BA(3)(a) of the Banking Act. However, this differs from section 180(1) of the Corporations 
Act 2001 as section 37CB which stipulates that ‘taking reasonable steps’ meant: 
                                                 
9 Also see Angus Young, ‘Restoring Trust in Australia’s Financial Services Sector: From the Banking Executive 
Accountability Regime to the Strengthening Corporate and Financial Sector Penalties’ (2019) 34(6) Journal of 
International Banking Law & Regulation, 185-93. 
10 Ibid. 
‘Without limiting what constitutes the taking of reasonable steps in relation to a matter for 
the purposes of this Division, the taking of reasonable steps in relation to that matter 
includes having: 
            (a) appropriate governance, control and risk management in relation to that matter; and 
(b) safeguards against inappropriate delegations of responsibility in relation to that matter; 
and 
(c) appropriate procedures for identifying and remediating problems that arise or may arise 
in relation to that matter.’ 
Therefore, expectations of the board are high and the legal risk for directors is considerably 
higher under BEAR. However, these new legal expectations on directors are not meant to be a 
substitute for good leadership. 
 
Other amendments include deferral of remuneration sections 37E, 37EA, 37EB, 37EC(3)-(5), 
37ED and 37E(1)(b)-(c). These sections are aimed at a proportioning the remuneration of 
accountable persons.11 Also worth noting are sections 37G, 37J, 37JA and 37JA dealing with 
enforcement and penalties. With regard to penalties, section 37G stipulates that the ADI is liable 
to a pecuniary penalty if it contravenes its obligations under this Part (other than this Division) of 
BEAR and prudential matters. The amount of the pecuniary penalty is an amount not exceeding 
1,000,000 penalty units for large ADI (Authorised Deposit-taking Institution), 250,000 penalty 
units for medium ADI or 50,000 penalty units for small ADI. Note that each penalty unit 
amounts to AUD210.  
 
The Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services 
Industry Final Report (the Hayne Report) was released on the 4th February 2019 and made a total 
of 76 recommendations to reform how the financial services industry in Australia should be 
regulated. Amongst its many recommendations it repeatedly referenced regulators’ poor 
performances. 12 
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In conjunction with this, the government initiated a review of APRA’s enforcement strategy in 
November 2018, which was prompted by the introduction of BEAR as well as the Hayne Royal 
Commission.13 A final report, the enforcement strategy review was published on the 29th March 
2019 and made 7 recommendations to, ‘further strengthen APRA’s enforcement approach’.14 In 
particular, there are two recommendations of relevance to BEAR. The first suggest that APRA’s 
enforcement appetite change from a ‘last resort’ to a ‘constructively tough’ approach. The 
second that APRA build a more forceful supervisory culture that better empowers and supports 
supervisors to hold entities and individuals to account, including through the use of enforcement 
action.15  On 16 April 2019 APRA published its new enforcement approach stating that  
APRA would be prepared to use enforcement to prevent and address serious prudential risks and 
to hold entities and individuals to account.16 
 
With the introduction of BEAR, the Hayne Royal Commission and APRA’s new enforcement 
strategy, directors of financial services companies are under considerable pressure to treat 
conduct risk as a governance priority. However, this is only half the story, the other half rests 
with the other regulator as well as recent legislative amendments to increase corporate and 
individual penalties for a wide range of wrongdoings.  
 
Reforming Corporate and Financial Sector Penalties and ASIC’s Regulatory Strategies 
In response to the recommendations of the Financial System Inquiry the government established 
the ASIC enforcement review taskforce (ASIC taskforce) on the 19 the October 2016.17 The 
taskforce made a number of recommendations aimed at increasing the regulatory powers of 
                                                 
13 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, ‘Enforcement Strategy Review: Final Report’ (2019) 4 
<https://www.apra.gov.au/sites/default/files/apra_enforcement_strategy_review_-_final_report_web.pdf>.  
14 Ibid., 9. 
15 Ibid., 9-10. 
16 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, ‘APRA’s Enforcement Approach’ 4 < 
https://www.apra.gov.au/sites/default/files/apras_enforcement_approach_web.pdf>. 
17 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Treasury Law Amendment (Strengthening Corporate and 
Financial Penalties) Bill 2018: Revised Explanatory Memorandum’ 5 
<https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/ems/r6213_ems_33c00c5c-5a07-41ac-bdab-
b6212e81d691/upload_pdf/690762_Revised%20EM.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf>. 
ASIC and the penalties for corporate and financial sector misconduct.18 A Bill was subsequently 
submitted to the Federal Parliament on 24th October 2018.19 It came into effect on the 12th March 
2019.20 This new Act in effect amends provisions of several legislations including the 
Corporations Act 2001, Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001, National 
Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 and Insurance Contracts Act 1984.21  
 
The key highlights of the new Act include increasing the maximum term of imprisonment from 6 
months to 2 years and others from 2 to 5 years.22  Other changes included removing 
imprisonment for strict and absolute liability offences,23 and modernizing and expanding the 
civil penalty regime with increases for a contravention of a civil penalty provision.24  It also 
expanded a number of provisions in the Corporations Act, Credit Act, Credit Code and 
Insurance Contracts Act into the civil penalty regime,25 thus harmonizing and expanding the 
infringement notice regime.26  Finally, it clarified the operation of the criminal provision for 
breaching directors’ fiduciary duties in section 184 of the Corporations Act.27 
 
The regulator, ASIC, has responded to the Australian government’s legal reform and criticisms 
from the Hayne Royal Commission. In a speech in February 2019 by John Price, Commissioner 
of ASIC, he said: 
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‘Issues around culture (the way we do things around here), governance (systems and 
processes that people should follow) and remuneration (what people get paid to do) all 
have a very strong influence on how people behave. So, it should be of no surprise to 
anyone that culture, governance and remuneration are all matters that ASIC will focus on 
using a variety of new supervisory and enforcement approaches.’28 
Furthermore, he states that: 
‘Close and continuous monitoring involves regularly placing ASIC staff on-site in major 
financial institutions to closely monitor their governance and compliance with laws. A key 
goal of this new approach is to modify the behaviour of the large institutions to further 
encourage them to place consumers first in their decision-making and quickly identify and 
respond to conduct that produces unfair outcomes. ASIC’s enforcement approach will have 
at its centre a focus on deterrence, public denunciation and punishment of wrongdoing by 
way of litigation… As regards Corporate Governance, ASIC has sought and received 
funding to undertake targeted reviews of corporate governance practices in large listed 
entities. This will allow us to shine a light on ‘good’ and ‘bad’ practices observed across 
these entities… The first is the role of the board and officers in the oversight (and in the 
case of officers, the management) of risk… Our review will look at how directors are 
actively exercising their stewardship functions, particularly in relation to non-financial 
risk.’ 29 
In terms of regulatory approaches, the Chair of ASIC, James Shipton said in a speech in March 
2019 that: 
‘The aim of this stance is to deter future misconduct and address the community 
expectation that wrongdoing be punished and denounced through the courts. This means 
that once: 
ASIC is satisfied that breaches of the law are more likely than not and: 
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 it is evident from the facts of the case that the pursuit of the matter would be in the 
public interest, 
 then we will actively ask ourselves: why not litigate this matter?’30 
In addition, Mr Shipton said: 
‘Moving forward, ASIC will continue to enhance the way we regulate, particularly with 
the adoption of a more intensive supervisory approach. Our new supervisory approach 
helps detect cultural failings that lead to conduct problems and breaches of the law. 
Supervision adds a focus beyond current known breaches to look at factors that create 
significant risk of future breaches. An important element of our new supervision approach 
is the use of data and market analysis to detect misconduct early. Since supervision has a 
strong focus on governance and culture, it allows ASIC to thoroughly understand the 
business models and risk management of firms and adjust our regulatory approach to the 
complexity, innovations and continuous change in entities and markets.’31 
The amendments to increase penalties for corporations and individuals, the clarifications to 
section 184 that impose criminal liabilities for breach of directors’ duties, as well as regulatory 
and enforcement approaches by ASIC in the post Hayne Royal Commission, have meant that 
directors’ role in preventing wrongdoing or misconduct has become indispensable to good 
governance.  
 
Trying to Turn Round a Tanker – Culture and Financial Regulation 
Even though the Hayne Report is a significant step in the sense that it makes much of leadership 
and culture and the need for change, it does adopt a very ‘managerialist’ stance in its definitions.  
Whilst this is not unsurprising, this approach does argues in favour of leaders being the vanguard 
in changing culture. However, as Freiberg notes, ‘Culture is a social phenomenon and can be 
understood as learned knowledge, belief, art, morals, law and custom in society. It is a powerful 
force that may determine the development and operation of a regulatory system.’32 It is evident 
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that culture is more than a set of written rules which in turn challenges legislators and leaders 
alike attempting to draft a set of rules to regulate such a social phenomenon.  
 
This does not mean that law and culture exist in isolation from each other. The law can help to 
shape culture, and as such be perceived as a product of a social construction,33 or a creature of 
culture.34 Culture also plays a role in the voluntary compliance of the law by supporting moral 
congruence, motivating adherence and reducing deviancy.35 However, internal contradictions 
between competing values may provoke discord or contests for dominance.36 Therefore, the 
relationship between the law and culture is a complex one that is not easy to untangle into a neat 
set of statutory statements.37 If we adopted a more social constructivist perspective then we 
might perceive that an organization is rather than has a culture. This makes it difficult for leaders 
alone to change that culture and attempts at change can be diverted or side-tracked by sub-
cultural groups with a vested interest in the status quo (for example those with a vested interest 
in perpetuating remuneration terms and conditions). Similarly, is expecting financial leaders to 
completely mend their ways wholly realistic?  Liu, Cutcher and Grant argue that for Australian 
Banking Chief Executives, the GFC was contextualised by them and the media to enhance both 
their authentic leadership skills and dynamism.38 Liu also provides evidence that, ‘vivid 
metaphors of crisis leadership….served to reinforce the romance of leadership and potentially 
elide considerations of banking reform in the aftermath of the GFC.’39Having been major players 
in creating the GFC leaders wallowed in their leadership bravado in resolving it. 
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If one reads both Tomasic40 and ‘Managing Culture: A good practice guide’41 one might be 
forgiven for assuming that the authors of both were discussing completely different topics.  
Tomasic’s argument rests on the notion that culture is inherently uncertain and therefore not 
useful as a legal or regulatory tool and, ‘unlikely to provide the ‘quick fix’ that some regulators 
had hoped for.’42  The CAANZ publication, however, adopts a far more ‘managerialist’ 
perspective in both defining and examining how to embed culture.  Assumptions here are that 
culture can and should be managed and that it is both leaders and the Board that are responsible 
for this.  So, for example, ‘Management is responsible for implementing and monitoring the 
desired culture as defined and set by the board.’43 Both these conceptualisations seem to adopt a 
very singular assessment of the notion of culture and appear to have either a fatalist or problem 
resolution stand point.  
 
Culture is a highly contested subject and as Alvesson and Sveningsson note, ‘Research treating 
culture as a variable sees organizational culture as something the organization has, while the root 
metaphor refers to culture as something the organizations is.’44 This offers an explanation as to 
how attempts at regulating culture in a legal/managerialist sense might not be successful, 
‘Organizations exist as systems of meanings which are shared to various degrees, a sense of 
commonality, or taken for grantedness is necessary for continuing organized activity so that 
interaction can take place without constant interpretation and re-interpretation of meaning’.45 The 
notion of a singular organizational culture which doesn’t take account of variety, differentiation 
and fragmentation is highly problematic.  All societies, whether business, national or tribal will 
have different groups which express different values.  Hence, attempting to impose culture 
change from the top is likely to meet barriers or hurdles, ‘Cultural manifestations shared by a 
larger collective constitute a very heavy counterweight to the possibilities of a top figure 
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exercising influence on people’s thinking and feelings.’ 46 It would be surprising if leadership at 
Board level were able to enact culture change when tasked by a regulatory body. Similarly, ‘the 
phenomenon of leadership in being interactive is by nature dialectical. It is shaped through the 
interaction of at least two points of reference, i.e. of the leaders and the led.’47  Therefore, within 
an organizational construct, an individual is only being led only to the extent that he/she accepts 
leadership and the terms it offers, and that these terms or offering coincide with acceptance 
amongst one’s own organizational sub-culture. However, this does neglect the fact that 
leadership must steer the company towards compliance. 
 
A Different Tack – Leadership in Compliance 
As Lager argues that, ‘A leader who strives for compliance is unlikely to lead an ethical 
organization…. and may miss key opportunities to increase workplace efficiency’.48 For 
example, compliance with the equal employment laws may vitiate legal liability for 
discrimination, but will hardly assure that the workplace provides an equal opportunity for all, or 
that the unique talents are employees, partners and other stakeholders are well-applied. It is 
important to note that compliance will not overcome the limitations in corporate governance and 
directors’ duty of care. Critics have argued that having compliance systems in place as part of 
risk management procedures will not, of itself, prevent directors from breaching the law.49 This 
is why leadership is integral to achieving accountability. At a broader level, the board’s role is to 
provide entrepreneurial leadership of the company with prudent and effective controls which 
enable risk to be assessed and managed.50 To this end, it should set strategic aims, ensure 
financial resources are in place and review executive management performance. Similarly, non- 
executive directors should satisfy themselves that financial information is accurate and that 
controls and systems of risk management are robust and defensible within the company. 
Bridging the gap comes from the correct leadership skills mix applied less as compliance and 
more as Leadership in Compliance.  Leaders of financial institutions would be best served 
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embedding compliance within their organizational culture rather than attempting to apply rules 
and regulations imposed on them.  Even though the International Standards Organization’s 
manual on Compliance Management Systems Guidelines offer some explanations on leadership, 
it focuses on structural, procedural, policy and commitment issues.51 We would suggest in 
Diagram 1 an argument for how Leadership in Compliance is both organizationally and 
culturally inhibited.  Utilising Pfeffer’s assessment of the condition which lead to organizational 
politics we argue that to achieve leadership in compliance it is necessary for Boards to recognise 
the magnitude of the task.  This involves: 
1. A wider organizational engagement of what and how to change culture and the design of 
engagement processes which are both clarified, signalled and ultimately embedded. If 
leaders have a ‘vision’ of cultural change which incorporates a new era of compliance 
what does this look like? 
2. Recognition of the notion of sub-cultures in organizational life, how these can 
predominate and derail change. Assessing methodologies for sub-cultural engagement in 
change programmes. 
3. Within a culture of compliance how is organizational scarcity managed? Do those with 
the greatest power and influence continue to ‘play politics’? 
4. How do Directors ensure what is done at the top will cascade down the organization?  
 
 
DIAGRAM 1 HERE 
 
 
Calls for leadership in compliance were echoed in APRA’s self-assessments of governance, 
accountability and culture released in May 2019 as a response to an earlier Final Report of the 
Prudential Inquiry into the Commonwealth Bank of Australia in May 2018.52 The key findings 
from this self-assessment exercise were: 
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‘ the weaknesses identified in the Prudential Inquiry are not unique to CBA;  
 there are consistent findings relating to non-financial risk management, accountabilities, 
and risk culture; and  
 institutions may not have fully identified the root causes of findings, resulting in the risk 
that actions to address weaknesses may not be effective or sustainable.’53 
APRA concluded that: 
‘Ultimately the responsibility for risk culture, and embedding strong frameworks and 
practices to deliver outcomes, rests with boards and senior leadership of regulated 
institutions. APRA cannot regulate good culture into existence, or design and implement 
strong frameworks for institutions. APRA does however have a role to play to provide a 
sound foundation and reinforce effective practices. To that end, APRA will strengthen and 
clarify its prudential framework, and concurrently broaden and deepen the scope and 
intensity of supervision. Under its newly adopted “constructively tough” enforcement 
appetite, APRA will also use its formal enforcement powers and the full extent of its toolkit 
as and where necessary to hold institutions and individuals to account.’54 
 
Clues to achieving leadership in compliance can also be found in the new fourth edition of the 
ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations released in February 2019. The 
ASX Corporate Governance Council stated that, ‘proposed changes anticipate and respond to 
some of the governance issues identified in recent enquiries, such as, the Hayne Royal 
Commission.’55  Whilst the changes to this new edition have not been substantial compared to 
the third edition, Principle 3 ‘Instil a culture of acting lawfully, ethically and responsibly’ offers 
some assistance towards improving compliance from the board. In particular, recommendation 
3.2, where a listed entity should: 
 
‘(a) have and disclose a code of conduct for its directors, senior executives and 
employees; and 
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(b) ensure that the board or a committee of the board is informed of any material breaches 
of that code.’56 
In addition, the commentary section of recommendation 3.2 stated that:  
‘A listed entity should articulate the standards of behaviour expected of its directors, 
senior executives and employees in a code of conduct. 
The board or a committee of the board should be informed of any material breaches of 
the entity’s code of conduct, as they may be indicative of issues with the culture of the 
organisation. 
For a code of conduct to be effective, all employees must receive appropriate training on 
their obligations under the code. Directors and senior executives must speak and act 
consistently with the code (again, setting the “tone at the top”) and reinforce it by taking 
appropriate and proportionate disciplinary action against those who breach it.’ 
 
Therefore embedding and ensuring all employees adhere to a code of conduct offers a tangible 
system of compliance.   
 
It is important to note that compliance is not simply policies, processes and procedures. It is a 
continuous process where the level of compliance achieved incrementally.57 Aligning a code of 
conduct with compliance obligations is vital to reducing compliance risks. The role of the board 
is to ensure the code of conduct is abided to by all employees, including themselves. This might 
require a risk committee at the board level to oversee that the code of conduct is enforced and 
that revised from time to time to meet new or amended regulatory obligations. 
 
The challenge of a code of conduct is to ensure a set of rules designed to induce desirable 
attitudes and behaviours which are consistent with the standards expected by the leaders who 
drafted it.58 These also provide a moral foundation by conveying principles setting standards of 
behaviour towards those that these codes would apply.59 In a more technical sense, codes form 
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part of agreements in business-to-business and business-to-consumers contracts.60 The 
effectiveness of any code would involve the enforcement for breaches against certain parts or 
provisions of that code in the form of a disciplinary mechanism and process.61 The threat of 
punishment is an essential part of this disciplinary process.62 Sanctions are designed to reflect the 
severity of the actions of the individual rather than a punishment and more importantly be 
deterrent.63 Ultimately, the most serious misconduct of any individual in the company is to have 
their employment terminate. To what extent leaders play a role in such a disciplinary process is 
an important matter that needs to be considered. If leaders are members of a disciplinary panel or 
committee, this can be construed as an authority partaking in the enforcement process of the 
code. Even if they are not part of this process, leaders could attest to the vigour of compliance by 
establishing a set of procedures and penalties for misconduct which are subsequently 
administered. However, this begs the question of whether a Director’s involvement in the 
disciplining of staff for alleged misconduct is overextending their mandate of accountability 
towards the shareholders into become a quasi-regulator being deputized by regulatory authorities 
to enforce the law or regulations via codes of conduct. This is where compliance professionals 
can play an important role in assisting leaders.  
 
Leaders and the Compliance Professionals 
The Banking Act, section 37BA(3)(h) stipulates that, ‘senior executive responsibility for 
management of the ADI's compliance function’ is an accountable person. As accountable 
persons, senior managers are involved in compliance functions that have the same obligations as 
directors set out under section 37CA discussed in above; therefore they have the common aim to 
ensure compliance functions are effective. As such, effectiveness would require compliance 
professionals to help management achieve this goal. However, the Hayne Royal Commission 
failed to acknowledge the role of compliance professionals. 
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Young argues that, 
‘[T]he reforms in BEAR and strengthening corporate and financial penalties appeared to 
assume compliance is a process-orientated task like a black box where input is at one end 
and output at the other because there was no discussion on how organisations and 
individuals go about achieving various regulatory objectives.’64 
 He adds that, 
‘[T]he complexity of implementing BEAR and ensuring its effectiveness should not be 
underestimated. Compliance professionals intervene at the first signs of trouble, whether 
that may be at the departmental level or specific individuals no matter what position these 
people hold. This means proactive monitoring, reporting all concerns irrespective of the 
compliance risks or position of personnel involved, and repeat training organization wide. 
To accomplish such a robust compliance management regime, compliance professionals 
must be authorised to intervene so as to halt possible mischief by any individuals and police 
the organisation from top to bottom. In short, compliance professionals should be proactive 
gatekeepers to prevent and rectify any conduct by staff that might put the organisation at 
risk of regulatory breach.’65 
 
Therefore, for leadership in compliance to work, leaders need to work closely with compliance 
professionals. Currently, there is no consensus as to which department compliance professionals 
should be assigned or whom they report to.66 Some companies prefer compliance professionals 
report to the general counsel or chief legal officer, others report directly to senior management 
like the CEO, CFO, COO or CRO.67 Given the importance of the compliance under BEAR and 
recent amendments to the Corporations Act, boards should be directly involved in compliance, at 
least in the monitoring of compliance risks.68 Further, the implication from the regulatory 
obligations is clear, leaders have to work closely with compliance professionals.  
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Conclusions  
The regulatory reforms in Australia thus far placed more emphasis on directors to lead and 
change conduct. This is supported by increasing the deterrent effect with greater penalties placed 
on both the entity and senior managers including directors for failures to rein in misconduct 
committed by the companies and the staff. Whilst such reforms are not ground-breaking, it 
certain ups the ante for those deemed under the law to be accountable. 
 
A natural and instinctive response from directors and senior management could be greater 
shrewdness and pragmatism. The implication is negative where individuals could carefully 
calculate their risk exposures and be better prepared to defend their decisions and indecisions. 
Being self-protective and limiting their personal liability could be a new norm for leaders. If this 
becomes the new practice, a new sort of impairment could emerge in financial services 
companies in Australia, one of guardedness and apprehension, which would likely lead to ‘harm’ 
from a business perspective.  
 
An alternative this article has proposed is leadership in compliance. The proposition is simple; to 
embed the right culture with the aid of a code of conduct. Through this code companies create a 
culture of compliance. This would also involve the board and senior management taking the lead 
by overseeing policies, processes, and procedures. More importantly, this would continuously 
improve the level of compliance achieved incrementally. This might also require a risk and 
compliance committee at the board level to oversee that the code of conduct is enforced. 
Implementation would also require compliance professionals to execute, monitor, and perform 
other aspects compliance tasks. Thus having them reporting directly to senior management and 
the board would be integral to actualizing leadership in compliance.  
DIAGRAM 1 
 
 
